Brother Refresh EZ Print Subscription Service: Difference between revisions
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The Brother Industries Ltd.: '''Refresh Program Subscription Service''' is a Subscription-as-a-Service ('''SubS''') launched in August 2021. The program claims to offer domestic and business users the advantage of an on-demand, lower-cost printing solution that provides genuine Brother consumables directly to their door, without the need for end-user consumable management. | The Brother Industries Ltd.: '''Refresh Program Subscription Service''' is a Subscription-as-a-Service ('''SubS''') launched in August 2021. The program claims to offer domestic and business users the advantage of an on-demand, lower-cost printing solution that provides genuine Brother consumables directly to their door, without the need for end-user consumable management. | ||
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*monochrome printing now makes '''up to 80% of total print jobs''' in a home or small office environment. <ref name=":0" /> | *monochrome printing now makes '''up to 80% of total print jobs''' in a home or small office environment. <ref name=":0" /> | ||
*color printing has '''decreased in use by 34%''' over the 3 year period measured. <ref name=":0" /> | *color printing has '''decreased in use by 34%''' over the 3 year period measured. <ref name=":0" /> | ||
By comparing the user data against the claim of cost-savings and stipulations in methodology from Brother, it is clear the scenario is one in which the choice given by Brother in no way matches a real-world situation or printing habits of the user. Furthermore, Brother engages in a purposefully misleading comparison when they state that the saving is based upon ''"average cost per page of eligible like standard capacity cartridge"'' for they must compare identical products as only genuine Brother cartridges are supplied in the program. | By comparing the user data against the claim of cost-savings and stipulations in methodology from Brother, it is clear the scenario is one in which the choice given by Brother in '''no way matches a real-world situation or printing habits of the user'''.<ref>[https://wiki.rossmanngroup.com/images/0/0a/Brother_FY2012_New_Product_Lines.png Brother FY2012 NPD]</ref> Furthermore, Brother engages in a purposefully misleading comparison when they state that the saving is based upon ''"average cost per page of eligible like standard capacity cartridge"'' for they must compare identical products as only genuine Brother cartridges are supplied in the program. | ||
======Assumptions====== | ======Assumptions====== | ||
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As the above data illustrates, Brother's claim that the program can '''"save the end-user up to 50%"''' is purposefully misleading. They do this by using the following methods: | As the above data illustrates, Brother's claim that the program can '''"save the end-user up to 50%"''' is purposefully misleading. They do this by using the following methods: | ||
#'''Scenario Manipulation''': Brother | #'''Scenario Manipulation''': Brother creates a situation where the user runs with the service for only a month, ending the program before the billing cycle before or prior to the auto-replenishment alert. | ||
#'''Comparing Different Programs''': this is a clear misrepresentation. Here Brother relates Pay-Per-Page to Pay-Per-Cartridge, a false and misleading comparison. The matrix shows us that the Brother price is roughly half that of the next supplier, but here the user '''owns the cartridge''' bought from Staples and only the '''rents the ability to print a certain number of pages''' from Brother. | #'''Comparing Different Programs''': this is a clear misrepresentation. Here Brother relates Pay-Per-Page to Pay-Per-Cartridge, a false and misleading comparison. The matrix shows us that the Brother price is roughly half that of the next supplier, but here the user '''owns the cartridge''' bought from Staples and only the '''rents the ability to print a certain number of pages''' from Brother. | ||
We note also that should the end-user run with the program for a year, then the Brother program is the most expensive option for printing. | We note also that should the end-user run with the program for a year, then the Brother program is the most expensive option for printing. | ||
====== EZ Auto Reorder Brother Cost Matrix | ======EZ Auto Reorder Brother Cost Matrix====== | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
! | ! | ||
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|Yes | |Yes | ||
|} | |} | ||
''<small>NB: Brother only listed here. All other competitor data remains identical to the EZ Print Cost Comparison Matrix.</small>'' | |||
====== Validated Claim ====== | ======Validated Claim====== | ||
The EZ Auto Reorder subscription offers the end-user a '''10% discount''' on cartridges while they are enrolled in program. This reduces the cost-per-cartridge by $4.80 when the product is supplied directly from Brother. | The EZ Auto Reorder subscription offers the end-user a '''10% discount''' on cartridges while they are enrolled in program. This reduces the cost-per-cartridge by $4.80 when the product is supplied directly from Brother. | ||
== Subscription History == | ==Subscription History== | ||
======Overview====== | |||
To understand the introduction rational of subscriptions within a traditional hardware company such as Brother, one must first understand how the changes in sales and profitability have historically developed within the markets that they operate. | |||
======Brother Industries, Ltd.====== | |||
Brother was established in Japan in '''1908''' <ref>[https://wiki.rossmanngroup.com/images/a/a9/Brother_Sales_Revenue_1928-2020.png Brother Sales Revenue (1928-2020).png]</ref> primarily as an industrial manufacturer of machine tools and parts. It was not until 1928 that Brother launched its first mainline product: a head-wear specific industrial sewing machine. Owing to their history in manufacturing, Brother's machines were good quality and highly regarded. They sold well and prior to the second-world war, Japanese companies like Brother had access to a productive and low-cost labor force. This allowed Brother to expand its product line and to firmly capture a share of the industrial sewing category; a market in which they still operate today. | |||
The post war years saw significant Japanese government focus on industrialization.<ref>Mosk, Carl (August 12, 2023) [https://eh.net/encyclopedia/japanese-industrialization-and-economic-growth/ "Japanese Industrialization and Economic Growth"] Economic History Association. Retrieved February 8, 2025</ref> And by the early '''1960's''' and '''1970's''', Japan's electronics manufacturing sector was not only mature but had rapidly expanded. Facts such as a large national labor pool, new access to western technology and the skill-to-cost benefits from earlier government investment, quickly made Japanese manufacturers the leaders in high-quality, low-cost electronic products. Brother too, benefited from this economic environment. It invested heavily in the technology sector and by '''1971''', released a product that would change the company direction and growth into the foreseeable future: a high-speed, '''dot-matrix printer'''. | |||
======Segment Reliance====== | |||
Into the '''1990's''', Brother identified its Printing & Solutions ('''P&S''') segment as a global category for growth and shifted significant resources directly towards this market. And while Brother maintained its leadership in core categories such as industrial sewing, machine tools and parts, the company continued to make further gains through P&S and in electronic products such as labeling. The returns in these segments continued to provide Brother capital for expansion. They developed product lines that took advantage of broadening demand, not only through industrial buyers to whom Brother traditionally catered, but with small office and home office users ('''SOHO''') who began to purchase Brother's products for their high reliability and reasonable cost. By the mid-1990's Brother had a mature and robust printing portfolio and had released many successful and profitable lines: | |||
*laser printers (both color & mono) | |||
*all-in-one printers (print, fax & scan) | |||
*inkjet printers (high-speed color) | |||
*garment, label and mobile printers. | |||
Throughout the late 1990's and early '''2000's''' the company continued to focus within the P&S segment and invested in long-term channel relationships. Now an establish brand, Brother's sales and profitability were firmly tied to the '''parts and consumables''' market. Brother understood that through channels such as OEM, vendors, distributors and large retailers, they could maintain strong end-user brand affiliation and leverage this to further create an ongoing demand. To acquire new industrial and SOHO buyers, Brother engaged in heavy promotional schedules and further product offerings. It introduced high-end, all-in-one laser printers and high-speed inkjet printers, all at price points not before seen in the market. Brother also sought growth in emerging countries. The company invested aggressively in Asia by promoting and selling low-cost '''monochrome laser printers''', which by now had became their strength and specialty. | |||
[[File:Brother_FY2012_New_Product_Lines.png|thumb|504x504px]] | |||
Then into the '''2010's''' Brother's previously positive financial results started to plateau. Its operating income and profits fell, and net sales, though marginally up, had failed to meet forecast. Furthermore, its Printing & Solutions (P&S) segment had not shown the growth expected, especially in Asia where they had invested heavily. | |||
Despite these poor results Brother's strategy remained largely the same: '''grow in all business and all regions'''. It continued to push forward with its aggressive emerging market expansion and it increased mass advertising throughout Japan. Further products and solutions were added to the P&S portfolio including web-conferencing and greeting card software. Brother continued to focus on maintaining its US and EU presence through retail channels and seeking growth through new SOHO & SMB customers. Brother also increased sales staff, sales channels and supporting promotions in an effort to expand the sales of mono laser printers in emerging markets. | |||
But by '''2015''' investors and shareholders had started to ask some tough questions. Brother had achieved net sales forecast targets in some segments but company-wide income and profit were in significant decline, The previously stable Machinery & Solution division was in free-fall and the anchor for sales and growth, Printing & Solutions (P&S), had suffered a 4.3% profit contraction. | |||
In Brother's EOY financial briefing the company acknowledged the stagnation in the P&S market and offered the following insights: | |||
#Global profitability in Laser Business Printers ('''LBP''') was declining due to competitor entry and generic consumables availability. | |||
#The printer hardware market was now very mature and the targeted growth by new product releases was not returning profit. | |||
#Digitization of documents, smartphone uptake and their affordability continued to shrink the printing market by 5% YOY. | |||
#Multi-function Center ('''MFC''') and All-in-One ('''AIO''') machines were eroding sales growth of use-specific product lines. | |||
#Consumables demand for conventional inkjet cartridge machines were being replaced by high-capacity Ink Tank models. | |||
With these points Brother had informed investors that the traditional strategy of developing hardware products, releasing them through sales channels and then realizing profitability through brand recognition and consumables sales had become highly uncertain. Furthermore, Brother acknowledged that these strategies had caused model proliferation, driven up stock holding requirements, cannibalized profitable lines and may have directly encouraged the demand for generic parts alternatives. | |||
Here Brother did two significant things. Firstly, it downgraded its forecasts to mitigate pressure for short-term market performance stating that the business would not return to overall profitability until 2018. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, it supported the profitability target by releasing a mid-term business strategy: '''CS [https://global.brother/en/investor/financial-info/archives B2018]'''. In this document, Brother outlined a series of broad changes. It advocated for restructured business segments and saw the need to relocate personal and investments. It wanted to consolidate internal divisions to create "synergies" supporting B2018 but all change, Brother stated, must underpin a common function and enhance the task of business model transformation. That is: | |||
'''<nowiki/>'To change and reposition the existing printing business to one that is clearly defined for corporate profitability enhancement'.''' | |||
'''Brother Business Segment Return 2024''' | ==Subscription: The Birth== | ||
======'When You Cannot Thrive, Seek Rent to Survive'====== | |||
''(work-in-progress)'' | |||
'''Brother Business Segment Return 2024''' | |||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
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|1.11% | |1.11% | ||
|} | |} | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
<references /> | <references /> | ||
{{DEFAULTSORT:Brother Refresh Subscription Service}} | {{DEFAULTSORT:Brother Refresh Subscription Service}} | ||
[[Category:Brother]] | |||
[[Category:Subscription-based services]] | [[Category:Subscription-based services]] | ||